

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
November 13, 1962

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TO : The Secretary
Through: S/S
FROM : IO - Harlan Cleveland

SUBJECT: Codification of "Agreements" re Cuba

There has been a good deal of confusion, in the negotiations so far, as to just who has agreed to what and for how long.

Following is a chronological run-down of some excerpts from published official proposals and responses and a summary of what has and has not been agreed.

October 25:

U Thant proposal to U.S. and USSR: "Voluntary suspension of all arms shipments to Cuba and also the voluntary suspension of the quarantine measures. . . for a period of two or three weeks. . . (to) give time to the parties concerned to meet and discussion. . . I shall gladly make myself available. . ."

U.S. response: "You have . . . invited preliminary talks to determine whether satisfactory arrangements can be assured. Ambassador Stevenson is ready to discuss promptly these arrangements with you . . ."

USSR response: "I declare that I agree with your proposal. . ."

October 26:

U Thant proposal to U.S. and USSR: ". . . that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba might be instructed to stay away from the interception area for a limited time only, in order to permit discussion of the modalities. . . (and) "that instructions may be issued to United States vessels in the Caribbean to do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next few days. . . (as) a prelude to a quick agreement in principle. . ."

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U.S. response: "If the Soviet government accepts and abides by your request. . .you may be assured that this government will accept and abide by your request. . . we can then proceed urgently to meet the requirement that these offensive military systems in Cuba be withdrawn. . ."

USSR response: "We therefore accept your proposal and have ordered the masters of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba . . .to stay out of the interception area. . ."

U Thant to Castro: "Your Excellency can make a significant contribution . . . by directing that the construction and development of major military facilities . . .be suspended during the period of negotiations which are now under way. . ."

October 27:

Khrushchev to Kennedy letter(broadcast before delivery):
"I therefore make this proposal: We agree to remove from Cuba those means which you regard as offensive means . . . (you) will remove. . . similar means from Turkey. . .after that persons entrusted by the UN Security Council may check on the spot. . .Of course, the authorization of the Governments of Cuba and of Turkey is necessary for the entry into those countries of these agents. . ."

"We will make a statement. . .that the Soviet government gives a solemn promise to respect the inviolability of the frontiers and the sovereignty of Turkey. . .The U.S. Government will make a similar statement with respect of Cuba. . ."

White House statement: ". . .as an urgent preliminary to consideration of any proposals, work on the Cuban bases must stop; offensive weapons must be rendered inoperable; and further shipments of offensive weapons to Cuba must cease. . .As to proposals concerning the security of nations outside this hemisphere. . . These efforts can continue as soon as the present Soviet created threat is ended."

Kennedy to Khrushchev letter (referring to unpublished Khrushchev letter of October 26): "As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals . . . are . . . :"

"1. You would agree to remove these weapons systems. . . under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with

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suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems. . .

"2. We. . . would agree -- upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments -- (a) to remove promptly the quarantine. . . and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. . .

"The effect of such a settlement. . . would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding 'other armaments'. . . and if . . . you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals."

Castro to U Thant: "The Revolutionary Government of Cuba would be prepared to accept the compromise that you request . . . provided that . . . the U.S. Government desists from threats and aggressive acts against Cuba, including the naval blockade. . .". . . our government would be glad to receive you. . . with a view to direct discussions on the present crisis. . ."

October 28:

Khrushchev to Kennedy letter: "The Soviet government . . . has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union . . .

"I regard with respect and trust the statement you made . . . that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba . . . we are prepared to reach agreement to enable the United Nations Representatives to verify the dismantling. . . in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling, there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict.

"I note with satisfaction that you have responded. . . as well with regard to . . . a more thoughtful appraisal of the international situation . . .

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...about a detente between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries. . .we . . . are prepared to continue to exchange views. . .and find a reasonable solution. We would like to . . .exchange views on the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, general disarmament, and other problems. . ."

"...the Soviet government has sent . . .Kuznetsov to New York . . .

Kennedy to Khrushchev letter: "...I consider my letter to you of October 27 and your reply of today as firm undertakings . . .which should be promptly carried out. I hope that the necessary measures can at once be taken through the United Nations. . . so that the United States. . .can remove the quarantine. . .

"I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament. . .we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and the great effort for a nuclear test ban. . .we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed. . .The United States government would be prepared to discuss these questions urgently. . ."

U Thant to Castro letter: "...I am pleased to note that Cuba . . .is prepared to accept the suggestion I made. . .provided that. . .while negotiations are in progress, the United States Government 'desists from . . .the naval blockade'

"I have much pleasure in accepting your invitation...

"I would very much hope that . . .a solution would be reached by which the principles of respect for the sovereignty of Cuba would be assured, and it may also be possible for action to be taken which would reassure other countries which have felt themselves threatened. . ."

U Thant to Kennedy: (with reference to Kennedy to Khrushchev letter of October 27, but not released): "...I would also like to be able to convey to . . .Castro the assurances. . .in your letter to. . .Khrushchev that upon the establishment of adequate arrangements to insure the

carrying out

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carrying out of the objectives mentioned. . .the U.S. Government would remove promptly the quarantine. . . and also give assurances against the invasion of Cuba, in which other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to join.

"I hope that my understanding of the lines on which a satisfactory solution of this problem could be reached is correct."

Stevenson to U Thant (not released): "I have been authorized to confirm your understanding of the lines. . . Accordingly you are authorized to convey to the Cuban authorities the assurances contained in President Kennedy's letter of October 27 to Chairman Khrushchev."

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IN SUMMARY:

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(A) There have been three agreements:

1. In response to U Thant's initiative, the USSR agreed to keep its ships out of the quarantine area and the U.S. agreed to avoid a direct confrontation on that condition...while negotiations proceeded.
2. The Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of October 27 produced a one-for-one deal -- confirmed by both. The Soviet Union agreed to remove the missiles and Khrushchev accepted "with respect and trust" the President's assurance that there would be no U.S. invasion of Cuba.
3. The U.S. complied with U Thant's watered-down Castro condition for his visit to Havana: suspension of the quarantine and surveillance during the negotiations.

(B) The issue of inspection rests as follows:

1. The U.S. has referred consistently to the need for UN or "suitable international"

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inspection

inspection of weapons removal and incoming cargo -- the latter tied to ~~the~~ giving "assurances against an invasion of Cuba."

2. Khrushchev's letter of October 25 said: "...we are prepared to reach agreement to enable the United Nations Representatives to verify the dismantling. . ."
3. This issue is clouded by:
 - (a) Khrushchev's proposal for a Cuba-Turkey base swap explicitly stated that concurrence of these countries would be needed for inspection.
 - (b) Castro's refusal to entertain the idea of inspection.
 - (c) U Thant's solicitude for the sovereignty of Cuba in accepting Castro's invitation in which he undoubtedly was relating the issue of inspection to Cuban sovereignty.
 - (d) The question of whether the U.S. would accept (a) aerial reconnaissance as confirmation of dismantling and (b) sea inspection by ICRC as adequate assurance against further arms imports.

C. The agreement which was the heart of the October 27 exchange -- dismantling in return for a non-invasion assurance -- is thus not firm from our side, and is probably considered far from firm by Castro, though it was accepted by Khrushchev as a basis for dismantling.

D. There has been flat agreement on the need for -- and substantial agreement of the content of -- further negotiations: Specifically, both Khrushchev and the President have referred to a NATO-Warsaw Pact detente, to halting the nuclear arms race, and to general disarmament as subjects for urgent discussion. Implicitly, there have been suggestions of a review of the overseas base question. And generally, there are references from both sides to reducing tensions and resolving "other controversial issues", including a lasting solution in the Caribbean.